

Chapter 2: Weighted Voting

Math 107

Examples of Weighted Voting Systems

- Electoral College - Business partnership
- NBA Draft 40% capital, 20%, 40% 10%

Definitions

Players – voters

Weights – how much power a player has

Quota – # of votes to pass a motion (at least a majority)

Dictator – weight $\geq$ quota

Veto Power – can prevent a motion

Dummy – voter with no power

Coalitions – set of players voting together

Grand Coalition – All players

Winning Coalition – coalition whose weight $\geq$ quota

Critical Players – required in a winning coalition

Critical Count – number of times a player is critical
quota, p_1, p_2, p_3 weights

Ex 1: Looking at $\{101:99,98,3\}$, who has the power? $\{51:49,48,3\}$
 $\frac{1}{3}$ each! $\{p_1, p_2\}, \{p_1, p_3\}, \{p_2, p_3\}, \{p_1, p_2, p_3\}$

Ex 2 (LC): Consider the weighted voting system: $[q: 6, 4, 3, 3, 2, 2]$.

a) What is the smallest value the quota q can take? $\boxed{11}$

b) What is the largest value the quota q can take? $\boxed{20}$

c) What is the value of q if **at least** three-fourths of the votes are required?

$$\frac{3}{4} \cdot 20 = \boxed{15}$$

d) What is the value of q if **more than** three-fourths of the votes are required?

$$\frac{3}{4} \text{ is } 15 \rightarrow \boxed{16}$$

Ex 3 (LC): In the following weighted voting systems, which players have veto power?

- a) [9: 8, 4, 2, 1] P_1 (If they leave, it cannot pass)
 b) [12: 8, 4, 2, 1] P_1, P_2
 c) [14: 8, 4, 2, 1] P_1, P_2, P_3

Banzhaf Power Index (BPI):

$$\frac{\text{critical count each player}}{\text{total critical count}}$$

COMPUTING THE BANZHAF POWER DISTRIBUTION

- **Step 1.** Make a list of all possible *winning* coalitions.
- **Step 2.** Within each winning coalition determine which are the *critical* players. (For record-keeping purposes, it is a good idea to underline each critical player.)
- **Step 3.** Find the *critical counts* $B_1, B_2, \dots, B_N$.
- **Step 4.** Find $T = B_1 + B_2 + \dots + B_N$.
- **Step 5.** Compute the Banzhaf power indexes: $\beta_1 = \frac{B_1}{T}, \beta_2 = \frac{B_2}{T}, \dots, \beta_N = \frac{B_N}{T}$.

Ex 4: Find the Banzhaf power distribution of the weighted voting system.

P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5
 [11: 5, 4, 3, 2, 1] ~~125~~ ~~134~~
 CC: 7, 5, 3, 3, 1
 Total: 19
 (3) $\{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_3\}, \{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_4\}$
 (4) $\{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_3, \underline{P}_4\}, \{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_3, \underline{P}_5\}, \{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_4, \underline{P}_5\}$
 $\{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_3, \underline{P}_4, \underline{P}_5\}$
 ~~$\{\underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_3, \underline{P}_4, \underline{P}_5\} = 10$~~
 (5) $\{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_3, \underline{P}_4, \underline{P}_5\}$

B.P.D. $P_1: \frac{7}{19}, P_2: \frac{5}{19}, P_3: \frac{3}{19}, P_4: \frac{3}{19}, P_5: \frac{1}{19}$

Ex 5 (LC): Find the Banzhaf power index of Player 3. [12: 5, 4, 3, 2, 1]

3: $\{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_3\}$ 4: $\{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_3, \underline{P}_4\}, \{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_3, \underline{P}_5\}, \{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_4, \underline{P}_5\}$
 5: $\{\underline{P}_1, \underline{P}_2, \underline{P}_3, \underline{P}_4, \underline{P}_5\}$
 $P_3: \frac{3}{15} = \frac{1}{5}$

Shapley-Shubik Power

(Chapter 2 Continued)

Sequential coalitions – Every possible ordering of the candidates
 $\langle \rangle$

Factorial - $n! = n \cdot (n-1)(n-2) \cdots 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1$

4 cand: $4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = 24$ coalitions $4! = 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = 24$

Pivotal Player – the players whose votes turn a sequential coalition from winning to losing

Pivotal count - # of times a candidate is pivotal $\langle P_1, P_3, \underline{P_4}, P_2 \rangle$

Shapley-Shubik Power Index (SSPI) – $\frac{\text{players pivotal count}}{\text{total \# of coalitions}}$

Ex 6 (LC): Given the following weighted voting system: [10: 5, 4, 3, 2, 1]

a) How many Sequential Coalitions will there be?

$$5! = 5 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = \boxed{120}$$

1, 2, 3, 4, 5
 1, 2, 3, 5, 4
 1, 2, 4, 3, 5

b) Which is the pivotal player in $\langle P_1, P_2, \underline{P_3}, P_4, P_5 \rangle$?

$$5 + 4 + 3$$

1, 2, 4, 5, 3
 1, 2, 5, 3, 4
 1, 2, 5, 4, 3

c) Which is the pivotal player in $\langle P_5, P_4, P_3, \underline{P_2}, P_1 \rangle$?

$$1 + 2 + 3 + 4$$

■ COMPUTING A SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER DISTRIBUTION

- **Step 1.** Make a list of the $N!$ sequential coalitions with the N players.
- **Step 2.** In each sequential coalition determine the pivotal player. (For book-keeping purposes underline the pivotal players.)
- **Step 3.** Find the pivotal counts $SS_1, SS_2, \dots, SS_N$.
- **Step 4.** Compute the SSPIs $\sigma_1 = \frac{SS_1}{N!}, \sigma_2 = \frac{SS_2}{N!}, \dots, \sigma_N = \frac{SS_N}{N!}$.

$$3! = 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = 6$$


Ex 7: Find the Shapley-Shubik Power Distribution of [16: 9, 8, 7]

$$\begin{aligned} & \langle P_1, \underline{P_2}, P_3 \rangle \quad \langle P_2, \underline{P_1}, P_3 \rangle \quad \langle P_3, \underline{P_1}, P_2 \rangle \\ & \langle P_1, \underline{P_3}, P_2 \rangle \quad \langle P_2, P_1, \underline{P_3} \rangle \quad \langle P_3, P_2, \underline{P_1} \rangle \\ & \sigma_1 = \frac{4}{6} \quad \sigma_2 = \frac{1}{6} \quad \sigma_3 = \frac{1}{6} \end{aligned}$$

Ex 8: List all of the Sequential Coalitions of [q: P₁, P₂, P₃, P₄, ~~5~~]. (if time permits)

$$\begin{aligned} & \langle P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4 \rangle \quad \langle P_2, P_1, P_3, P_4 \rangle \quad \langle 3, 1, 2, 4 \rangle \quad \langle 4, 1, 2, 3 \rangle \\ & \langle P_1, P_2, P_4, P_3 \rangle \quad \langle P_2, P_1, P_4, P_3 \rangle \quad \langle 3, 1, 4, 2 \rangle \quad \langle 4, 1, 3, 2 \rangle \\ & \langle P_1, P_3, P_2, P_4 \rangle \quad \langle P_2, P_3, P_1, P_4 \rangle \quad \langle 3, 2, 1, 4 \rangle \quad \langle 4, 2, 1, 3 \rangle \\ & \langle P_1, P_3, P_4, P_2 \rangle \quad \langle P_2, P_3, P_4, P_1 \rangle \quad \langle 3, 2, 4, 1 \rangle \quad \langle 4, 2, 3, 1 \rangle \\ & \langle P_1, P_4, P_2, P_3 \rangle \quad \langle P_2, P_4, P_1, P_3 \rangle \quad \langle 3, 4, 1, 2 \rangle \quad \langle 4, 3, 1, 2 \rangle \\ & \langle P_1, P_4, P_3, P_2 \rangle \quad \langle P_2, P_4, P_3, P_1 \rangle \quad \langle 3, 4, 2, 1 \rangle \quad \langle 4, 3, 2, 1 \rangle \end{aligned}$$

The Electoral College



State	Weight	Shapley-Shubik	Banzhaf
Alabama	9	1.64%	1.64%
Alaska	3	0.54%	0.55%
Arizona	11	2.0%	2.0%
Arkansas	6	1.1%	1.1%
California	55	11.0%	11.4%
Colorado	9	1.64%	1.64%
Connecticut	7	1.3%	1.3%
Delaware	3	0.54%	0.55%
District of Columbia	3	0.54%	0.55%
Florida	29	5.5%	5.4%
Georgia	16	2.9%	2.9%
Hawaii	4	0.72%	0.73%
Idaho	4	0.72%	0.73%
Illinois	20	3.7%	3.7%
Indiana	11	2.0%	2.0%
Iowa	6	1.1%	1.1%
Kansas	6	1.1%	1.1%
Kentucky	8	1.5%	1.5%
Louisiana	8	1.5%	1.5%
Maine*	4	0.72%	0.73%
Maryland	10	1.8%	1.8%
Massachusetts	11	2.0%	2.0%
Michigan	16	2.9%	2.9%
Minnesota	10	1.8%	1.8%
Mississippi	6	1.1%	1.1%
Missouri	10	1.8%	1.8%

State	Weight	Shapley-Shubik	Banzhaf
Montana	3	0.54%	0.55%
Nebraska*	5	0.9%	0.91%
Nevada	6	1.1%	1.1%
New Hampshire	4	0.72%	0.73%
New Jersey	14	2.6%	2.6%
New Mexico	5	0.9%	0.91%
New York	29	5.5%	5.4%
North Carolina	15	2.8%	2.7%
North Dakota	3	0.54%	0.55%
Ohio	18	3.3%	3.3%
Oklahoma	7	1.3%	1.3%
Oregon	7	1.3%	1.3%
Pennsylvania	20	3.7%	3.7%
Rhode Island	4	0.72%	0.73%
South Carolina	9	1.64%	1.64%
South Dakota	3	0.54%	0.55%
Tennessee	11	2.0%	2.0%
Texas	38	7.3%	7.2%
Utah	6	1.1%	1.1%
Vermont	3	0.54%	0.55%
Virginia	13	2.4%	2.4%
Washington	12	2.2%	2.2%
West Virginia	5	0.9%	0.91%
Wisconsin	10	1.8%	1.8%
Wyoming	3	0.54%	0.55%